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We analyze if a change in accounting standard or a change in prudential regulation 
impacts banks’ loan loss provision. We find that, in general, the banks using a 
principles-based accounting standard exhibit a lower level of earnings management 
compared to banks using a rules-based accounting standard. When a country moves 
from pro-cyclical macro-prudential regulations to a dynamic provisioning regime, 
banks are more likely to set aside a larger amount of loan loss provision for the purpose 
of income smoothing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Existing literature presents mixed empirical results on banks’ use of Loan Loss 
Provision (LLP) as a tool for earnings management (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; 
Hasan and Wall, 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 
2008). Earnings management arises through a bank’s assessment of its expected 
loan losses and the subsequent subjective determination of LLP. The inherent 
subjectivity of the LLP process allows bank management to pursue other 
motivations that existing literature typically identifies as: income smoothening, 
capital management, or earnings signaling (Wahlen, 1994; Ahmed, Takeda, and 
Thomas, 1999; Anandarajan,, Hassan, and Lozano-Vivas, 2003; and Das and 
Ghosh, 2007).
Banks’ earnings management is a well-researched topic in the finance 
literature, but recent developments in macro-prudential regulation and changes 
in accounting standards have prompted further research into the potential for 
earnings management through LLP. The Norwalk agreement between the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) signed in September 2002 is an important milestone in accounting 
regulations. The agreement creates a convergence of two dominant accounting 
standards, the rules-based US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and the principles-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), in 
order to more fully support healthy global capital markets. The new, and arguably 
superior, reporting standards will dramatically affect the manner in which banks 
can recognize losses using their main operating accrual item—LLP.
Additionally, as a follow-up to the 2007 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), central 
banks across the globe are re-thinking their prudential regulatory frameworks that 
define the procedures and formulas that govern the amount of LLP bank managers 
need to set aside to buffer for potential loan losses.
Macro-prudential regulations are of two broad categories: pro-cyclical and 
dynamic provisioning. In a pro-cyclical framework, which most countries pursue, 
the central bank sets a specified percentile of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) to 
be maintained as LLP. One of the challenges of this framework is that during 
downturns in the business cycle, asset quality typically decreases, thus requiring 
managers to set aside more LLP. Such a provision tends to be counter-effective for 
central banks whose goal is to inject liquidity into the banking system. The GFC 
illustrated how excessive pro-cyclicality in the banking industry can amplify the 
business cycle through macro-financial linkages, which in turn has large negative 
spillover effects into the real economy (Panetta, Angelin, Albertazzi, Columba, 
DiCesare, Pilati, Salleo, and Santini, 2009). This challenge of the pro-cyclical 
framework leads to the alternative, known as dynamic provisioning, where LLP 
is determined through a formula that updates with business cycle information 
such that LLP would act as a counter-cyclical capital buffer. Essentially, banks 
gradually build loan loss revenue during the boom phase of the cycle and use 
this surplus during the economic downturn to cover excessive losses (Balla and 
McKenna, 2009; Carbó-Valverde and Rodríguez-Fernández, 2010; Chan-Lau, 2012; 
Pérez, Salas-Fumás, and Saurina 2011; and Burroni, Quagliariello, Sabatini, and 
Tola 2009).
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Bouvatier, Lepetit, and Strobel (2014), and Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas 
(2011) thoroughly analyze the impacts of a change in regimes and accounting 
standards for European commercial banks. Specifically, Bouvatier et al. (2014) 
examine if bank ownership structure and country regulatory factors in a given 
regime influence bank income smoothing behavior. They find that banks with 
higher ownership concentrations are most likely to use LLP to smooth income, but 
the degree of earnings management is less obvious in countries that have strong 
regulatory regimes and higher external audit quality. 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011), on the other hand, analyze the impact 
of mandatory IFRS adoption on listed European banks’ accounting quality. Under 
the new standards set forth by IFRS, banks can only recognize incurred losses, as 
opposed to expected future losses, as of the balance sheet date via rule International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) 39. Such a change from GAAP regulations strictly 
limits the ability of managers to use LLP in the pursuit of other motivations. 
Consequently, this stricter accounting method under IAS 39 significantly reduces 
income smoothing.
Our paper complements the contemporary work of Bouvatier et al. (2014) and 
Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) by analyzing how a joint change in bank 
accounting standards and a change in macro-prudential framework may affect the 
discretionary use of LLP for income smoothing, capital management, or earnings 
signaling for an international sample of banking institutions, rather than a single 
region. More specifically, we examine how competing regulatory frameworks 
affect the various motivations associated with managerial discretion over banks’ 
main accrual item, LLP; the cross-country framework allows for robust findings 
from the panel dataset. We ask a set of specific questions accordingly. Do changes 
in the macro-prudential environment (from pro-cyclical to dynamic provisioning) 
affect the motivation for earnings management of LLP? Do changes in bank 
accounting standards have an effect on the motivation for earnings management 
of LLP? What is the joint impact on the motivation for earnings management of 
LLP if banks are obligated to operate in both a changing prudential regulatory and 
accounting standard regime?
Our research question necessitates a large sample of national banks in 
both pro-cyclical and dynamic regimes. We analyze data for 7,343 individual 
banks that belong to 118 countries over the period 1999 to 2010. We find that, in 
general, bank managers use LLP to manage earnings for two purposes: income 
smoothening and capital management. We find no significant evidence in favor 
of the signaling hypothesis. If a country moves from a pro-cyclical to a dynamic 
provisioning regime, bank managers pursuing an income smoothing motive will 
generally set aside a larger amount of LLP. Regarding accounting standards, 
banks under principles-based accounting standards generally exhibit a lower 
overall level of earnings management compared to their rules-based counterparts. 
Finally, if a country undergoes a prudential regulation and accounting standard 
change simultaneously, the combined impact on managerial motivation for LLP 
is not statistically significantly different from banks in countries with existing 
conventional regulatory regimes or accounting standards.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the literature. 
Section III outlines the methodology. Section IV presents the descriptive statistics. 
Section V presents the regression results. Section VI provides concluding remarks.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Loan Loss Provisioning and Bank Earnings Management 
Banks’ incentives for using LLP as an earnings management tool depends on its 
financial performance, earnings volatility, and the need to build capital reserves. 
Bank managers weigh the trade-offs of earnings management tactics as higher 
provisions result in lower profits but create a safety net against future loan losses. 
In contrast, a lower level of provision increases reported profits but requires banks 
to use its capital reserves to cover larger than expected losses (Ahmed et al., 1999; 
and Fan and Wong, 2002).
Prior literature generally identifies three major explanations as to why bank 
managers pursue earnings management via LLP. First, the income smoothing 
hypothesis contends that during favorable economic times, managers keep extra 
provision that they can use as a cushion during a down turn in the business cycle 
to cover higher loan losses. Wahlen (1994) and Beaver and Engle (1996) present 
empirical evidence supporting this explanation. They show that LLP are positively 
related to bank pretax and provision earnings (EBTP). Second, proponents of the 
capital management hypothesis argue that bank managers can use LLP reserves as 
part of their minimum capital requirement when facing any capital shortfall; Das 
and Ghosh (2007) find a significantly negative relationship between LLP and bank 
capital that supports this supposition. Third, the earnings signaling hypothesis 
contends that managers may use higher LLP as a means of conveying better 
financial strength. If a bank, for instance, wants to signal its strength about future 
earnings when the market perceives its value as low, the bank will increase LLP to 
indicate its ability to absorb future potential losses. Accordingly, LLP is positively 
related to changes in earnings or future investment opportunities (Wahlen, 1994; 
Beaver and Engle, 1996).
B. Accounting Standards and Loan Loss Provisioning
Following the Norwalk agreement between the FASB and IASB in 2002, a number 
of studies emphasize the implications of the convergence of accounting standards, 
particularly in non-financial firms. Psaros and Trotman (2004) find a lower degree 
of earnings management when firms use a principles-based standard rather a rules-
based standard. Research by Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) and Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007) highlight the major financial statement effects of adopting 
different accounting standards that could play a role in earnings management 
decisions for managers.
Following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in 2002, many firms 
switched from accounting decisions to transaction decisions, suggesting that 
earnings management choices depend on the discretion given under different 
accounting standards (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008). Interestingly, Beest (2009) 
shows that either of the accounting standards lead to a comparable levels of 
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earnings management. However, managers using rules-based standards engage 
in earnings management through transaction decisions, while managers using 
principles-based standards engage in activity through accounting decisions.
More recently, Zhou, Xiong, Ganguli (2010) investigate whether changes in 
accounting standard add any value to accounting information in a transitional 
economy, such as China. They find that firms following IAS usually recognize 
losses in a timelier manner and smooth earnings less than firms adopting local 
GAAP. These findings resemble those of Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011). 
Capkun, Jeny, Jeanjean, and Weiss (2010) use a dataset of 1,635 European Union 
firms that went through mandatory transition from local GAAP to IFRS during 
the 2004-2005 timeframe and examine the flexibility of the IFRS standard and find 
that local GAAP firms with negative earnings generally show positive earnings 
reconciliations.
C. Pro-cyclicality in Prudential Regulatory Regimes
Prudential regulations provide explicit guidelines regarding the manner in 
which bank managers are to classify their loan portfolios. These regulations, for 
instance, dictate how much managers are to set aside from bank earnings based on 
a weighted loan-delinquency risk matrix. Prudential regulations are particularly 
important for the banking industry as the firms deal with depositor investments, 
and at times, may be highly leveraged. Further, loan delinquency rates increase 
during financial crises or economic recessions and this in turn affects banks’ 
capital adequacy and the ability to lend. The financial soundness of the industry 
is vitally important to the overall economy and is accordingly subject to high 
regulatory oversight. Bouvatier et al., 2014 find robust evidence that countries 
with strong regimes reduce earnings management behavior, and in particular 
income smoothing activities.
Spanish financial regulators were the first to initiate the concept of dynamic 
provisioning in 2002 as an alternative prudential framework that requires banks 
to maintain a LLP requirement by using a model that provides forward-looking 
business cycle forecasts. Following Spain’s regulatory change, financial regulators 
in other countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru have also initiated similar 
approaches in 2003, 2007, and 2009, respectively, with some minor variations to 
adjust for country-specific factors. The issues underlying a dynamic provisioning 
regime are still evolving under the prudential framework; hence, the debate on 
whether pro-cyclical or dynamic provisioning is the solution to the problems 
facing many banks is far from settled (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Wezel, 2010; 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2012; Chan-Lau, 2012).
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Variable Definitions
Cross-country empirical studies on LLP generally control for country-specific 
macroeconomic variables; namely, per capita GDP, per capita GDP growth, and 
inflation rate (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008—hereafter LLS, 
2008). Recent studies also acknowledge the role of country regulatory and legal 
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This table reports a description of the data set including variable names (column 1), variable description (column 2), data source 
(column 3) and expected sign (column 4).
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source Expected Sign
Dependent Variable
LLPi,t
Ratio of LLP over one-period
lag of total assets BankScope
Bank Characteristics
LLPi,(t-1) Lag of the dependent variable BankScope
+
(pro-cyclical)
CRARi,(t-1)
Required Tier-I capital, normalized by 
risk-weighted assets (RWA) BankScope
-
(capital 
management)
EBTPi,t
Earnings before tax and provisions over
one-period lag of total assets BankScope
+
(income 
smoothing)
ΔEBTPi,(t-1)
Change in earnings before tax and 
provisions over one-period lag of total 
assets
BankScope
+
(earnings 
signaling)
Prudential Regulation Indicator
DynDum Equal to 1 if country is implementing dynamic provisioning, 0 otherwise
Opposite/not 
significant
Accounting Standard Indicator
PrincDum Equal to 1 if a bank uses a principles-based accounting standard, 0 otherwise
Opposite/not 
significant
Bank Control
LNTA Natural log of bank total assets BankScope
Macroeconomic Controls
PCGDP Real GDP in billions of dollars per capita IMF
PCGDPG Real growth in per capita GDP IMF
INFL Annual inflation growth IMF
Regulatory/Legal Controls
DISCL Accounting disclosure index LLS (2008)
PRIVO Ratio of private credit to GDP LLS (2008)
MCAP Ratio of market capitalization to GDP LLS (2008)
SPREAD Interest rate spread LLS (2008)
PR Property RightDays to enforce a debt contract in LLSV (1997)
EDF the legal system Djankov et al. 
(2007)
Table 1.
Variable Description and Data Sources
frameworks, level of investor protections, and financial development (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)—hereafter LLSV, 1997; Fonseca and 
González, 2008). Regarding bank characteristics, asset size (measured in logs) is 
typically used as a control variable in the LLP literature (Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005). Accordingly, we include these country-specific and bank-specific control 
variables.
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5 http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/rafael-laporta/research-publications
6 These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, one or more of these hypotheses may be simultaneously 
true.
Table 1 presents descriptions and sources of all variables used in the empirical 
analysis. We collect the macroeconomic control data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and country regulation variables from Raphael La Porta’s 
website.5 Table I also summarizes the bank control and characteristic variables 
and the dependent variable (LLP). These data are collected from the BankScope 
database.
B. Hypotheses and Empirical Specification
B1. Hypothesis I: Prudential regimes and LLP
We hypothesize that the three commonly cited LLP motivations: income smoothing, 
capital management and earning signaling will be systematically different for pro-
cyclical and dynamic provisioning prudential regimes, after controlling for bank 
and country-specific factors. We use the commonly cited empirical specification 
as provided by Whalen (1994) and used by other studies (Ahmed et al., 1999; and 
Das and Ghosh, 2007). Equation (1) is the baseline equation used to test if LLP are 
a source of bank earnings management.
Where, loan loss provision (LLPi,t) is standardized by the previous year’s total 
assets, required Tier-I capital (CRARi,(t-1)) is normalized by risk-weighted asset, 
earnings before tax and provisions (EBTPi,t) is normalized by the previous year’s 
total assets, and ∆EBTPi,(t-1) is the percentage change in EBTP from the previous 
year.
Due to the nature of prudential regulation which requires bank managers to 
classify delinquent loans into different categories and set aside provisions based 
on a default risk matrix before they can write-off the loss, LLP are generally 
autocorrelated. Accordingly, we include a lag of LLPi,t as an explanatory variable 
in the regression. Ahmed et al., (1999) suggests that if income smoothing is the 
primary earnings management objective, the EBTPi,t coefficient will be positive. 
For capital management to be the principal motivation CRARi,(t-1) needs to have a 
negative coefficient. Finally, if the earnings signaling hypothesis is true, ∆EBTPi,(t-1) 
will have a positive coefficient.6
Hypothesis I states that under different prudential regimes, earnings 
management motivation(s) should vary; accordingly, we extend the baseline 
empirical Equation in (1) to account for a regime change, as shown in Equation (2). 
(1)
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We consider the pro-cyclical prudential regime as the base case and include a 
categorical indicator variable for dynamic provisioning (DynDumi,t), where the 
variable takes a value of 1 if a country follows dynamic provision regulations and 
is 0 otherwise.
B2. Hypothesis II: Accounting standards and LLP
Accounting standards and the LLP literature documents that firms migrating from 
rules-based to principles-based accounting standards have significant differences 
in earnings management (Bouvatier et al., 2014; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 
2011). We extend this analysis to a much broader sample of the banking industry 
and posit that motivations for LLP will be different under these two accounting 
standards, after controlling for bank and country-specific factors.
Hence, in Hypothesis II, we argue that accounting standards will affect the 
motivation for managerial discretion of LLP. We use the rules-based accounting 
standard as the base case and introduce a categorical indicator variable for the 
principles-based standard (PrincDumi,t), where the variable takes a value of 1 if a 
bank is using principles-based accounting standard and is 0 otherwise. Equation (3) 
specifies the model:
(2)
(3)
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7 These countries are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, India, the Republic of Korea, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
8 Hausman (1978).
B3. Hypothesis III: Combined Effect of changes in Prudential Regimes and changes in 
Accounting Standards on LLP
A subset of these countries that have transitioned from pro-cyclical to dynamic 
provisioning regimes are also migrating from local GAAP towards an IFRS 
standard.7
Hypothesis III states that changes in prudential regulations and accounting 
standards can impart systematically different rationale for managers to pursue 
earnings management of LLP. To investigate this combined impact, we use a 
specification that combines the indicator variables from Equations (2) and (3). It 
follows that Equation (4) provides the empirical model:
C. Econometric Techniques
We implement five different econometric approaches in our analysis of LLP and 
differential motivations encompassed in Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). Utilizing 
our large panel dataset, we report regression estimates using pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS), least squares dummy variable (LSDV) with year fixed effects 
(YFE), LSDV with bank fixed effects (BFE), panel estimates with random effects 
(RE), and panel general method of moments (GMM) estimates using two-step 
generalized least square (GLS) estimates with White-corrected standard errors. 
We use several econometric techniques to find more robust evidence on earning 
management motivation, as it applies to prudential regulations and accounting 
standards. As the sample includes a large cross-section of banks with fewer time 
series, we consider pooled OLS to begin with; the Hausman tests suggest that this 
intuition is correct.8 We also use the Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested panel 
GMM approach with two-step GLS estimations for robustness.
(4)
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This table provides the overall bank sample composition, which comprises 12 years of data, from 1999 to 2010, for 7,343 banks 
in 118 countries. BankScope reports four major types of accounting standards used in the banking industry: US/local GAAP, 
Regulatory Standards, International Accounting Standards (IAS), and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). These 
are classified into two major categories: rules-based and principles-based. US/local GAAP and Regulatory Standards are classified 
as rules-based, and IAS and IFRS are classified as principles-based accounting standards. Furthermore, prudential regulation is 
broadly categorized into two different types of regimes: pro-cyclical and dynamic. Panel A summarizes the distribution of banks 
in our sample by both accounting standard and prudential regulatory regime. This distribution is also sub-divided into US and 
non-US pro-cyclical regimes under the two different accounting standards. Panel B summarizes the accounting practices across 
the countries under a dynamic provisioning prudential framework. Panel C displays the frequency of the most current accounting 
practices for banks in each country where a pro-cyclical regime is the precedent.
Panel A: Distribution of Banks by Prudential Regime and Accounting Standards
Rules-based Principles-based Total Total
Prudential Regime
Local 
GAAP Regulatory IFRS IAS
Rules-
based
Principles-
based
a) US Pro-cyclical 235 5,703 - - 5,938 -
b) Non-US Pro-cyclical 874 - 270 55 874 325
a) Pro-cyclical 1,109 5,703 270 55 6,812 325
b) Dynamic 108 5 93 - 113 93
Total 1,217 5,708 363 55 6,925 418
Panel B: Accounting Practices Under Dynamic Provisioning Prudential Regime
Rules-based Principles-based
Country
Local 
GAAP
Regulatory
standards
IFRS IAS
1 Bolivia 8 - - -
2 Chile 1 - - -
3 Colombia 10 - - -
4 India 46 - - -
5 Italy - - 68 -
6 Korea, Rep. of 6 - - -
7 Paraguay 10 - - -
8 Peru 5 5 - -
9 Spain - - 23 -
10 Uruguay 9 - 2 -
11 Venezuela 13 - - -
Total 108 5 93 -
Table 2.
Composition of Sampled Banks
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
A. Data and Sample Composition
Table 2 presents the composition of our sample of banks. It includes 12 years of 
financial information between 1999 and 2010 for 7,343 banks across 118 countries. 
BankScope identifies four major accounting standards used in the global banking 
industry: US GAAP/local GAAP regulatory standards, IAS, and IFRS. US/local 
GAAP and regulatory standards are classified as rules-based accounting, while 
IAS and IFRS are classified as principles-based accounting.
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Panel C: Accounting Practices Under Pro-cyclical Prudential Regime
Rules-based
Principles-
based
Rules-based
Principles-
based
Country
Local
GAAP
Reg.
Std.
IFRS IAS Country LocalGAAP
Reg.
Std.
IFRS IAS
1 Albania - - 2 - 27 Costa-Rica 13 - - -
2 Algeria 4 - - - 28 Croatia - - 17 -
3 Angola 1 - - - 29 Cyprus 1 - 3 -
4 Argentina 22 - - - 30 Czech Rep. 4 - 6 -
5 Armenia - - 1 2 31 Denmark 25 - - -
6 Austria 25 - 4 - 32 Dominican Rep. 12 - - -
7 Azerbaijan - - 5 - 33 Ecuador 16 - - -
8 Bahamas - - 3 2 34 Egypt 16 - - 4
9 Bahrain - - 8 - 35 El Salvador 5 - - -
10 Bangladesh 18 - - - 36 Estonia - - 3 -
11 Barbados - - 1 - 37 Ethiopia 1 - 1 1
12 Belarus - - 4 - 38 France 53 - - -
13 Belgium 12 - - - 39 Georgia Rep. - - 5 -
14 Benin 2 - - - 40 Germany 69 - 5 -
15 Bhutan 2 - - - 41 Guatemala 12 - - -
16 Bosnia 1 - 5 - 42 Guyana - - 1 1
17 Botswana - - 1 1 43 Honduras 10 - - -
18 Brazil 44 - - - 44 Hungary 5 - 5 -
19 Brunei 1 - - - 45 Indonesia 27 - - -
20 Bulgaria - - 9 - 46 Iran 4 - - -
21 Burkina-Faso 3 - - - 47 Israel 10 - - -
22 Burundi 1 - - - 48 Japan 110 - - -
23 Cambodia - - - 1 49 Jordan 1 - 10 1
24 Cameroon 2 - - - 50 Kazakhstan - - 9 -
25 Canada 27 - - - 51 Kenya - - 8 4
26 China 12 - 1 1 52 Kuwait - - 5 -
27 Costa-Rica 13 - - - 53 Kyrgyzstan - - - 1
Table 2.
Composition of Sampled Banks (Continued)
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Table 2.
Composition of Sampled Banks (Continued)
Rules-based
Principles-
based
Rules-based
Principles-
based
Country
Local
GAAP
Reg.
Std.
IFRS IAS Country LocalGAAP
Reg.
Std.
IFRS IAS
54 Latvia - - 6 - 81 Rwanda - - - 2
55 Lebanon 1 - 8 8 82 Saudi Arabia 1 - 9 -
56 Lithuania 0 - 6 - 83 Senegal 2 - - -
57 Luxembourg 35 - - - 84 Serbia 1 - 3 -
58 Malawi 0 - - 3 85 Sierra Leone - - - 3
59 Malaysia 25 - - - 86 Slovakia - - 8 -
60 Mali 3 - - - 87 Slovenia - - 10 -
61 Malta - - 2 - 88 South Africa 1 - - -
62 Mauritius - - 2 1 89 Sri Lanka 9 - - -
63 Mexico 22 - - - - - - 2
64 Moldova Rep. - - 1 1 5 - - -
65 Mongolia - - 1 - 2 - - -
66 Morocco 2 - - -
67 Mozambique - - 2 -
68 Nepal 8 - - -
69 Netherlands 3 - - -
70 Nicaragua 2 - - -
71 Niger 2 - - -
72 Nigeria 6 - - -
73 Norway 2 - - -
74 Oman - - 5 -
75 Pakistan 5 - - -
76 Panama 2 - 7 -
77 Poland 4 - - -
78 Qatar 1 - 5 -
79 Romania - - 8 -
80 Russian Fed. 4 - 21 -
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Panel A summarizes the distribution of banks by accounting standard and 
prudential regulatory regime. This panel is further sub-divided into US and non-
US pro-cyclical regimes under the two different accounting standards analyzed. 
Of the 7,343 commercial banks, 6,925 banks use rules-based standard, while 1,217 
banks comply with local GAAP rules and the remaining 5,708 banks comply with 
mandatory regulatory standards. Alternatively, only 418 banks fall under the 
principles-based accounting standard, with 363 banks complying with the IFRS 
and the remaining 55 with the IAS regulations. Of the 6,925 banks complying with 
the rules-based norms, the vast majority (6,812 banks) adhere to a pro-cyclical 
provisioning regime, while the remaining 113 banks fall under the purview of a 
dynamic regime. Similarly, of the 418 banks under a principles-based accounting 
standard, 325 banks fall under a pro-cyclical regime, while the other 93 are 
associated with dynamic provisioning. Analyzing the overall sample, 5,938 banks 
(a significant portion) in the dataset constitute US financial institutions and fall 
under a rules-based and pro-cyclical regime. Further, there is little diversity among 
the US banks in that 5,703 banks comply with regulatory standards set forth by 
financial regulators, while the remaining 235 institutions comply with the US/
local GAAP. The remaining sample of pro-cyclical banks (1,109) are international 
banks, and of these 874 conform to the rules-based standards, while the remaining 
325 falls under the category of principles-based.
Panel B summarizes accounting practices across countries following the 
dynamic provisioning rules. Presently, regulators in 11 countries (Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, India, Italy, South Korea, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela) pursue a dynamic prudential regulatory regime. While these countries 
share the same prudential framework, the shift in regulatory regime for each nation 
from a pro-cyclical to a dynamic provisioning regime occurred over different time 
periods. Spain, one of the pioneer countries to initiate dynamic provisioning, 
initiated the change in 2001. Later, Uruguay adopted such rules at the beginning 
of 2007. Despite this heterogeneity in the regime adoption policy, the frequency 
distribution depicts the most current information on accounting practices for 
banks that have changed or are currently changing prudential regimes. Panel C 
displays the most current accounting practices for banks in nations where the pro-
cyclical regime is a precedent. This portion of the overall sample is made up of a 
total of 107 countries.
B. Descriptive Statistics of Bank Variables
Table 3 presents summary statistics for bank financial characteristics for the 
overall sample (1999 to 2010) period. Panel A presents summary statistics for all 
banks, of LLP, EBTP, CRAR, total regulatory capital (TRG)—which represents 
the equity that must be held by financial institutions as a legal requirement set 
by regulators as a percentage of RWA, return on average assets (ROAA), return 
on average equity (ROAE), and bank total assets (TA). LLP, EBTP, CRAR, TRG, 
ROAA, and ROAE are measured as percentages; TA is measured in thousands of 
US dollars. The mean value of bank TA are $4.63 billion, while the median size is 
only $141.6 million. The large standard deviation of bank TA ($52.7 billion) reveals 
severe variation among the different institutions in terms of their dollar asset size; 
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this large disparity is driven by US banks. Similarly, the distribution of LLP also 
has high variability about its mean.
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the overall sample of banks, which comprises 12 years of data, from 1999 to 2010, 
for 7,343 banks in 118 countries. Panel A presents the summary statistics, for all banks, of loan loss provisions (LLP), earnings 
before tax and provisions (EBTP), Tier-I required capital (CRAR), total regulatory capital (TRG), return on average assets (ROAA), 
return on average equity (ROAE), and bank total assets (TA). LLP and EBTP are normalized by total assets (which is measured in 
thousands of dollars), while CRAR and TRG are both normalized with respect to risk-weighted assets (RWA). LLP, EBTP, CRAR, 
TRG, ROAA, and ROAE are measured as percentages. Panel B reports similar summary statistics for banks under either the pro-
cyclical loan loss provisioning regime or the dynamic provisioning regime. Panel C summarizes the descriptive statistics of the 
banks classified by the two broad accounting standards: rules-based and principles-based. Welch t-statistics are reported for the 
difference in mean between competing regimes and accounting standards, where *, ** , and *** denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance based on two-tailed test statistics, respectively.
Panel A: Overall Sample
 Mean Median
 Std. 
Dev.
Bank 
Years
LLP 40.79 17.11 101.96 85,870
EBTP 17.66 13.6 24.56 77,961
CRAR 18.96 14.8 24.14 79,762
TRG 1.76 1.5 4.51 86,758
ROAA 1.05 1.01 2.64 87,296
ROAE 9.61 9.83 17.44 87,286
TA 4,625,954 141,568 52,748,755 87,329
Panel B: Banks Under Pro-cyclical Regime vs. Banks Under Dynamic Provisioning Regime
Pro-cyclical Dynamic Welch
 Mean Median
 Std. 
Dev.
Obs.  Mean Median
 Std. 
Dev.
Obs. t-statistic
LLP 39.96 16.74 101.42 84,143 81.46 48.63 118.78 1,727 -14.41***
EBTP 17.74 13.6 24.63 76,962 12.09 8.85 17.17 999 10.25***
CRAR 19.01 14.88 24.23 78,607 15.09 12.34 16 1,155 8.21***
TRG 1.75 1.5 4.32 85,066 2.2 2.01 10.26 1,692 -1.82**
ROAA 1.05 1.01 2.64 85,477 1.13 0.9 2.68 1,819 -1.35
ROAE 9.57 9.81 17.04 85,467 11.6 12.11 30.8 1,819 -2.80***
TA 4,164,919 136,951 49,836,865 85,509 26,286,730 2,831,166 128,000,000 1,820 -7.36***
Panel C: Banks using rules-based accounting standard vs. banks using principles-based 
accounting standard
Rules-based Principles-based Welch
 Mean Median
 Std. 
Dev.
Obs.  Mean Median
 Std. 
Dev.
Obs. t-statistic
LLP 37.97 16.41 91.98 81,638 95.32 44.89 211.27 4,232 -17.58***
EBTP 17.69 13.6 24.82 75,473 16.82 13.71 14.74 2,488 2.81***
CRAR 18.92 14.71 24.46 76,538 19.77 16.16 14.73 3,224 -3.11***
TRG 1.7 1.5 4.56 82,483 2.83 2.26 3.24 4,275 -21.82***
ROAA 1.03 1 2.54 82,839 1.5 1.27 4.03 4,457 -7.74***
ROAE 9.51 9.76 15.64 82,835 11.52 12.09 37.55 4,451 -3.55***
TA 3,772,834 133,023 46,303,099 82,865 20,462,381 1,122,938 120,000,000 4,464 -9.26 ***
Table 3.
Bank Descriptive Statistics
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Panel B presents summary statistics for banks under competing pro-cyclical 
and dynamic provisioning regimes. It is clear that banks under the dynamic 
regime generally set aside higher LLP compared to their pro-cyclical counterparts. 
Bank managers maintain EBTP of an average of 39.96% of TA for LLP under a pro-
cyclical regime, while managers under dynamic provisioning retain an average 
of 81.46% of TA for LLP. This difference complements the fact that bank EBTP 
in pro-cyclical regimes are generally higher than that of banks under a dynamic 
provisioning regime. Regarding capital adequacy, we find that banks in pro-
cyclical regimes maintain higher Tier-I capital requirements. These findings imply 
that banks may use LLP in managing capital adequacy requirements.
Panel C presents summary statistics of banks classified by accounting standards. 
We find that bank managers using principles-based norms maintain higher LLP—
that is, an average of 95.32% of TA, while managers following rules-based norms 
only retain an average of 37.97% of TA as LLP. In addition, capital requirements 
and profitability ratios are generally higher for banks following the principles-
based accounting standards, and these differences are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Overall, there appear to be significant differences in bank 
characteristics based on prudential regulation regime and accounting standards.
C. Country Control Variables
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the country control variables that include 
both country-specific macroeconomic factors (Panel A) and regulatory/legal factors 
(Panel B). Macroeconomic variables include per capita GDP (PCGDP), per capita 
GDP growth (PCGDPG), and inflation (INFL). Following LLS (2008), we include 
several regulatory/legal control variables, namely the accounting disclosure 
index (DISCL), efficiency of debt enforcement (EDF), property rights (PR), market 
capitalization (MCAP), privatization (PRIVO), and interest rate spread (SPRD).9
From Panel A, we note that average PCGDP for the overall sample of 
countries increases steadily from about 2001 to 2008. However, post-2008, it 
declines moderately (7.15%) which coincides with the GFC. Average inflation 
exhibits a gradual decrease from 1999 to 2007 before increasing sharply over the 
2008 period and then precipitously falling below 5% post-crisis. While country-
specific macroeconomic variables are time variant, regulatory control variables are 
generally constant for the given set of countries. Panel B highlights the regulatory 
and legal control variable summary statistics. The interpretations of the variables 
follow that of LLS (2008) and Djankov, McLiesh, and Schleifer (2007).
9 Variable definitions follow in Table I and are defined following LLS (2008) and LLSV (1997).
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V. REGRESSION RESULTS
A. Evidence on Loan Loss Provisioning: Overall Sample
First, we investigate the presence and motivation of earnings management via 
LLP using the overall sample of 118 countries (a total 57,967 bank years) without 
differentiating between accounting standards and prudential regulatory regimes. 
The income smoothing hypothesis contends that a positive relation exists between 
LLP and EBTP, implying that banks keep higher LLP during business cycle 
expansions. The capital management hypothesis argues LLP is negatively related 
with CRAR, as bank managers use LLP reserves as part of the regulatory capital 
requirements when shortfalls occur. Lastly, the earnings signaling hypothesis 
suggests that LLP is positively related to ∆EBTP, as managers use LLP as a signal 
to convey better financial health of the bank to the investors.
Table 5 presents the regression estimates for the baseline Equation (1). First, 
we note that LLP is positively related to its one-period lag, consistent with the 
pro-cyclicality paradigm. This observation seems rather obvious as only 11 of 
the 118 countries in the sample pursue dynamic provisioning regimes, while the 
other countries generally follow the pro-cyclicality rules. Second, we note that, in 
general, LLP is negatively related to CRAR providing evidence that banks use LLP 
as tool to help manage their Tier-I capital requirements. Third, LLP is positively 
related to EBTP, supporting the income smoothing hypothesis. Lastly, we find no 
evidence in favor of the earnings signaling argument as ∆EBTP is insignificant 
in all regression estimates. Parameter estimates and significance are robust to 
regression estimators and model specification.
This table reports panel regression results following the model as specified in equation (1). The sample period spans from 1999-
2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years, in 118 countries. Column (1) presents the regression estimates using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Column (2) reports regression estimates using least squares dummy variable (LSDV) with year fixed 
effects (YFE). Column (3) presents regression estimates using LSDV with bank fixed effects (BFE). Column (4) reports regression 
panel estimates with random effects (RE). Column (5) reports the panel general method of moments (GMM) estimates using two-
step generalized least square (GLS) estimates with White-corrected standard errors. For each variable, the first row corresponds to 
the coefficient estimate and the second row reports the standard error in parenthesis. Based on two-tailed test statistics, ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Loan loss provisions (LLP) is the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include the one-period lag of loan loss provision (LLPi,(t-1)), Tier-I required capital (CRARi,(t-1)), earnings before tax and 
provisions (EBTPi,t), change in earnings before tax and provisions (ΔEBTPi,(t-1)), natural log of total assets (LNTA) as control for bank 
size, several country control variables: GDP per capita (PCGDP), GDP per capita growth (PCGDPG), inflation (INFL), and several 
regulatory/legal variables: accounting disclosure index (DISCL), efficiency of debt enforcement (EDF), property rights (PR), market 
capitalization (MCAP), privatization (PRIVO), and interest rate spread (SPRD). Both LLPi,t and EBTPi,t are normalized by the one-
period lag of TA, and CRARi,(t-1) is normalized by risk-weighted assets (RWA). PCGDP and PCGDPG are measured in US Dollars.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
CONS 64.790 *** -29.902 *** 64.790 *** 1.166 *** --
[8.990] [10.110] [8.730] [0.000] --
a. Bank Characteristics
LLPi,(t-1) (+) 0.510 *** 0.498 *** 0.510 *** 0.000 *** 0.506 ***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.000] [0.005]
CRARi,(t-1) (-) -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.000] [0.011]
EBTPi,t (+) 0.556 *** 0.59 *** 0.556 *** 0.006 *** 0.537 ***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.000] [0.068]
Table 5.
LLP Overall Panel Regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
∆EBTPi,(t-1) (+) -0.009 0.062 -0.009 0.002 *** 0.004
[0.137] [0.135] [0.133] [0.000] [0.137]
b. Bank Control
LNTA 3.635 *** 3.583 *** 3.635 *** 1.166 ** 3.683 ***
[0.191] [0.189] [0.186] [0.000] [0.192]
c. Country Macroeconomic Controls
PCGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PCGDPG -3.294 *** 0.349 *** -3.294 *** 0.001 ** -3.581 ***
[0.098] [0.149] [0.095] [0.213] [0.102]
INFL -1.376 *** -0.724 *** -1.376 *** 0.011 ** -1.160 ***
[0.201] [0.318] [0.195] [0.000] [0.210]
PRIVO -22.513 *** 5.193 -22.513 *** -- -20.694 ***
[4.561] [5.015] [4.429] -- [5.077]
MCAP 34.833 *** 12.11 * 34.833 *** -- 33.549 ***
[7.327] [7.389] [7.115] -- [8.313]
SPREAD -0.058 0.008 -0.058 -- -0.099 **
[0.044] [0.046] [0.043] -- [0.045]
PR -11.727 *** 1.965 -11.727 -- -10.512 ***
[1.926] [2.574] [1.870] -- [2.098]
DISCL 19.693 * -9.766 19.693 -- 19.918 *
[10.563] [11.747] [10.258] -- [11.726]
EDF -1.034 *** -0.210 *** -1.034 *** -- -1.092 ***
[0.061] [0.073] [0.060] -- [0.066]
Adj. R-sqd. 0.400 0.413 0.400 0.435 0.402
Table 5.
LLP Overall Panel Regression (Continued)
B. Impact on Prudential Regulations on LLP
Hypothesis I states that the motivation for earnings management via LLP under 
different prudential regulation should be dissimilar as each regime promotes 
different incentives for using earnings management. We consider the commonly 
followed pro-cyclic provisioning regime as the base case and include an indicator 
variable for dynamic provisioning as shown in Equation (2). Table 6 summarizes 
the regression estimates.
Panel B shows that the indicator variable (DynDum) and interaction terms 
reveal little change in motivation across the panel. Specifically, compared to 
banks following pro-cyclical rules, banks following dynamic provisioning rules 
exhibit weak evidence of any systematic change in motive to conduct earnings 
management using LLP. We note that under the dynamic provisioning regime 
the one-period lag of LLP becomes negative (-0.042), although it is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. Nonetheless, this suggests that the pro-
cyclicality is altered under the dynamic regime. Similar to our results from 
Equation (1), we find strong support for both the income smoothing and capital 
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management hypotheses. The negative (positive) coefficients on the CRAR (EBTP) 
interaction terms show that managers complying with dynamic rules also use LLP 
as a tool for capital management and income smoothing like banks following pro-
cyclical rules. What is particularly interesting is the magnitude of the interaction 
terms in Panel B; they show that under the dynamic provisioning regime banks 
pursuing an income smoothing motive will generally set aside a larger amount 
of LLP than pro-cyclical firms. In contrast, banks pursuing capital management 
motives will set aside a slightly smaller amount of LLP for that purpose when 
compared to the pro-cyclical counterpart. We again find no significant empirical 
evidence for LLP as an earnings signaling tool.
This table reports panel regression results following the model as specified in equation (1). The sample period spans from 1999-
2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years, in 118 countries. Column (1) presents the regression estimates using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Column (2) reports regression estimates using least squares dummy variable (LSDV) with year fixed 
effects (YFE). Column (3) presents regression estimates using LSDV with bank fixed effects (BFE). Column (4) reports regression 
panel estimates with random effects (RE). Column (5) reports the panel general method of moments (GMM) estimates using two-
step generalized least square (GLS) estimates with White-corrected standard errors. For each variable, the first row corresponds to 
the coefficient estimate and the second row reports the standard error in parenthesis. Based on two-tailed test statistics, ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Loan loss provisions (LLP) is the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include the one-period lag of loan loss provision (LLPi,(t-1)), Tier-I required capital (CRARi,(t-1)), earnings before tax and 
provisions (EBTPi,t), change in earnings before tax and provisions (ΔEBTPi,(t-1)), natural log of total assets (LNTA) as control for 
bank size, several country control variables: GDP per capita (PCGDP), GDP per capita growth (PCGDPG), inflation (INFL), and 
several regulatory/legal variables: accounting disclosure index (DISCL), efficiency of debt enforcement (EDF), property rights (PR), 
market capitalization (MCAP), privatization (PRIVO), and interest rate spread (SPRD). Both LLPi,t and EBTPi,t are normalized by 
the one-period lag of TA, and CRARi,(t-1) is normalized by risk-weighted assets (RWA). PCGDP and PCGDPG are measured in US 
Dollars. DynDumi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the prudential regulatory regime of a country follows dynamic provisioning 
and 0 otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
CONS 100.346 *** 7.217 100.346 *** -248.685 *** --
[10.110] [12.584] [9.828] [11.658] --
a. Bank Characteristics
LLPi,(t-1) (+) 0.508 *** 0.498 *** 0.508 *** 0.333 *** 0.505 ***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
CRARi,(t-1) (-) -0.091 *** -0.093 *** -0.091 *** -0.212 *** -0.089 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.028] [0.011]
EBTPi,t (+) 0.542 *** 0.580 *** 0.542 *** 0.033 0.530 ***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.100] [0.068]
∆EBTPi,(t-1) (+) -0.030 0.049 -0.030 0.236 -0.021
[0.138] [0.137] [0.135] [0.143] [0.138]
b. Impact of Dynamic Provisioning
DynDumi,t -47.187 *** -28.628 *** -47.187 *** -- -42.269 ***
[6.231] [6.612] [6.057] -- [6.597]
DynDumi,t*LLPi,(t-1) -0.042 0.007 -0.042 -0.202 *** -0.098
[0.058] [0.057] [0.056] [0.063] [0.065]
DynDumi,t*CRARi,(t-1) -1.030 *** -0.429 -1.03 *** -2.105 *** -0.914 ***
[0.348] [0.346] [0.339] [0.898] [0.353]
DynDumi,t*EBTPi,t 11.253 *** 7.353 *** 11.253 *** 6.178 *** 6.889 ***
[1.775] [1.767] [1.725] [2.736] [1.921]
Table 6.
LLP and Prudential Regulatory Regime Regression
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Table 6.
LLP and Prudential Regulatory Regime Regression (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
DynDumi,t*∆ EBTPi,(t-1) 0.292 0.184 0.292 -0.385 0.637
[0.845] [0.837] [0.821] [0.997] [0.846]
c. Bank Control
LNTA 3.700 *** 3.637 *** 3.700 *** 23.879 *** 3.715 ***
[0.191] [0.19] [0.186] [1.096] [0.192]
d. Country Macroeconomic Controls
PCGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PCGDPG -3.167 *** 0.355 *** -3.167 *** -3.371 *** -3.440 ***
[0.099] [0.150] [0.097] [0.101] [0.104]
INFL -2.051 *** -1.509 *** -2.051 *** -2.413 *** -1.869 ***
[0.212] [0.352] [0.206] [0.222] [0.221]
e. Country Regulatory/Legal Controls
PRIVO -25.236 *** -1.230 -25.236 *** -- -24.555 ***
[4.588] [5.184] [4.460] -- [5.107]
MCAP 38.455 *** 19.569 *** 38.455 *** -- 43.156 ***
[7.378] [7.574] [7.172] -- [8.391]
SPREAD -0.113 *** -0.015 -0.113 *** -- -0.163 ***
[0.044] [0.046] [0.043] -- [0.046]
PR -14.264 *** -5.053 * -14.264 *** -- -15.715 ***
[2.107] [2.967] [2.048] -- [2.291]
DISCL 11.693 -7.737 11.693 -- 4.349
[10.768] [11.891] [10.468] -- [11.897]
EDF -1.254 *** -0.425 *** -1.254 *** -- -1.352 ***
[0.066] [0.085] [0.064] -- [0.071]
Adj. R-sqd. 0.402 0.413 0.402 0.435 0.403
C. Impact of Transition in Accounting Norms on LLP
Hypothesis II states that the motivation for earnings management using LLP under 
various accounting norms are systematically different. We consider the most 
prevalent rules-based accounting standard as the base case and then include 
an indicator variable (PrincDum) for the principles-based accounting standard 
as shown in Equation (3). Table 7 summarizes the regression estimates. Panel B 
shows that the principles-based dummy variable and interaction terms reveal little 
change for the panel. In particular, transition from a rules-based to a principles-
based norm does not exhibit a significant difference in the motivation or magnitude 
of bank earnings management. In general, most estimates yield insignificant 
coefficients on the indicator variable and interaction terms.
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This table reports panel regression results following the model as specified in equation (1). The sample period spans from 1999-
2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years, in 118 countries. Column (1) presents the regression estimates using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Column (2) reports regression estimates using least squares dummy variable (LSDV) with year fixed 
effects (YFE). Column (3) presents regression estimates using LSDV with bank fixed effects (BFE). Column (4) reports regression 
panel estimates with random effects (RE). Column (5) reports the panel general method of moments (GMM) estimates using two-
step generalized least square (GLS) estimates with White-corrected standard errors. For each variable, the first row corresponds to 
the coefficient estimate and the second row reports the standard error in parenthesis. Based on two-tailed test statistics, ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Loan loss provisions (LLP) is the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include the one-period lag of loan loss provision (LLPi,(t-1)), Tier-I required capital (CRARi,(t-1)), earnings before tax and 
provisions (EBTPi,t), change in earnings before tax and provisions (ΔEBTPi,(t-1)), natural log of total assets (LNTA) as control for 
bank size, several country control variables: GDP per capita (PCGDP), GDP per capita growth (PCGDPG), inflation (INFL), and 
several regulatory/legal variables: accounting disclosure index (DISCL), efficiency of debt enforcement (EDF), property rights (PR), 
market capitalization (MCAP), privatization (PRIVO), and interest rate spread (SPRD). Both LLPi,t and EBTPi,t are normalized by 
the one-period lag of TA, and CRARi,(t-1) is normalized by risk-weighted assets (RWA). PCGDP and PCGDPG are measured in US 
Dollars. PrincDumi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting standard of a country follows a principles-based standard 
and 0 otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
CONS 107.926 *** 12.536 107.926 *** -- --
[9.692] [11.47] [9.422] -- --
a. Bank Characteristics
LLPi,(t-1) (+) 0.508 *** 0.497 *** 0.508 *** 0.000 *** 0.504 ***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.000] [0.005]
CRARi,(t-1) (-) -0.091 *** -0.092 *** -0.091 *** 0.001 *** -0.089 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.000] [0.011]
EBTPi,t (+) 0.543 *** 0.580 *** 0.543 *** 0.006 *** 0.524 ***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.000] [0.068]
ΔEBTPi,(t-1) (+) -0.03 0.051 -0.03 0.002 *** -0.019
[0.139] [0.137] [0.135] [0.000] [0.138]
b. Impact of Principles-Based Standard
PrincDumi,t -59.484 * 3.390 -59.484 * -- -66.383 **
[30.213] [30.777] [29.371] -- [31.939]
PrincDumi,t*LLPi,(t-1) -0.115 0.068 -0.115 0.003 *** -0.130
[0.095] [0.094] [0.092] [0.001] [0.105]
PrincDumi,t*CRARi,(t-1) 0.208 -0.043 0.208 0.131 0.247
[0.257] [0.257] [0.250] [0.872] [0.273]
PrincDumi,t*EBTPi,t 1.360 0.229 1.360 3.446 1.424
[1.912] [1.894] [1.858] [0.534] [1.976]
PrincDumi,t*ΔEBTPi,(t-1) 1.166 0.662 1.166 0.291 1.236
[0.837] [0.829] [0.813] [0.182] [0.837]
c. Bank Control
LNTA 3.810 *** 3.758 *** 3.810 *** 1.169 *** 3.851 ***
[0.194] [0.192] [0.188] [0.000] [0.194]
d. Country Macroeconomic Controls
PCGDP 0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PCGDPG -3.202 *** 0.328 ** -3.202 *** 0.001 *** -3.506 ***
[0.098] [0.149] [0.096] [0.000] [0.103]
INFL -1.943 *** -1.645 *** -1.943 *** 0.009 *** -1.66 ***
[0.207] [0.339] [0.201] [0.000] [0.215]
Table 7.
 LLP and Bank Accounting Standards Regression
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Table 7.
 LLP and Bank Accounting Standards Regression (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
e. Country Regulatory/Legal Controls
PRIVO -32.570 *** -2.765 -32.570 *** -- -32.082 ***
[4.692] [5.278] [4.562] -- [5.253]
MCAP 49.069 *** 25.13 *** 49.069 *** -- 49.773 ***
[7.475] [7.633] [7.266] -- [8.495]
SPRD -0.151 *** -0.073 -0.151 *** -- -0.212 ***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.043] -- [0.046]
PR -9.800 *** 2.007 -9.800 ** -- -8.253 ***
[1.951] [2.632] [1.897] -- [2.125]
DISCL -1.858 -30.207 * -1.858 -- -7.440
[10.935] [12.283] [10.631] -- [12.289]
EDF -1.431 *** -0.526 *** -1.431 *** -- -1.577
[-0.070] [0.085] [0.068] -- [0.077]
Adj. R-sqd. 0.402 0.414 0.402 0.403
D. Combined Effect of Changes in Prudential Rules and Change in Accounting Standards
Hypothesis III states that the joint impact of changes in prudential rules and 
accounting norms will yield a change in the motivation for bank LLP earnings 
management. We analyze the impact of a joint change in prudential regime and 
accounting standards by including both interaction variables as shown in Equation 
(4). Table 8 reports the regression estimates of the joint change in standards. 
Results show that banks under a principles-based accounting standard are likely 
to exhibit lower levels of earnings management, as expressed by the negative fixed 
effects coefficient in Panel D compared to their rules-based accounting standard 
counterparts. Moreover, banks under the dynamic prudential regime are, in 
general, more likely to maintain additional levels of provisioning, as shown by the 
positive fixed effects coefficient in Panel E, compared to the pro-cyclical regimes. 
Overall, we find that a (simultaneous) joint change, as captured through the two 
interaction terms in panel F, on the motivation for earnings management of LLP is 
not significantly different from banks with no change in policies. More aptly, the 
motives and magnitude of the effects of earnings management via LLP remains 
largely unchanged for the panel under a joint transition.
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This table reports panel regression results following the model as specified in equation (1). The sample period spans from 1999-
2010 with 7,343 banks and a total of 57,967 bank years, in 118 countries. Column (1) presents the regression estimates using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Column (2) reports regression estimates using least squares dummy variable (LSDV) with year fixed 
effects (YFE). Column (3) presents regression estimates using LSDV with bank fixed effects (BFE). Column (4) reports regression 
panel estimates with random effects (RE). Column (5) reports the panel general method of moments (GMM) estimates using two-
step generalized least square (GLS) estimates with White-corrected standard errors. For each variable, the first row corresponds to 
the coefficient estimate and the second row reports the standard error in parenthesis. Based on two-tailed test statistics, ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively. Loan loss provisions (LLP) is the dependent variable. Explanatory 
variables include the one-period lag of loan loss provision (LLPi,(t-1)), Tier-I required capital (CRARi,(t-1)), earnings before tax and 
provisions (EBTPi,t), change in earnings before tax and provisions (ΔEBTPi,(t-1)), natural log of total assets (LNTA) as control for 
bank size, several country control variables: GDP per capita (PCGDP), GDP per capita growth (PCGDPG), inflation (INFL), and 
several regulatory/legal variables: accounting disclosure index (DISCL), efficiency of debt enforcement (EDF), property rights (PR), 
market capitalization (MCAP), privatization (PRIVO), and interest rate spread (SPRD). Both LLPi,t and EBTPi,t are normalized by 
the one-period lag of TA, and CRARi,(t-1) is normalized by risk-weighted assets (RWA). PCGDP and PCGDPG are measured in US 
Dollars. DynDumi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the prudential regulatory regime of a country follows dynamic provisioning 
and 0 otherwise. PrincDumi,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the accounting standard of a country follows a principles-based 
standard and 0 otherwise.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
CONS 80.102 *** 6.729 80.102 *** -249.763 *** --
[11.001] [12.919] [10.702] [11.874] --
a. Bank Characteristics
LLPi,(t-1) (+) 0.506 *** 0.497 *** 0.506 *** 0.332 *** 0.503 ***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
CRARi,(t-1) (-) -0.091 *** -0.092 *** -0.091 *** -0.211 *** -0.089 ***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.028] [0.011]
EBTPi,t (+) 0.546 *** 0.580 *** 0.546 *** 0.041 0.529 ***
[0.068] [0.067] [0.066] [0.100] [0.068]
ΔEBTPi,(t-1) (+) -0.020 0.052 -0.020 0.236 -0.011
[0.138] [0.137] [0.135] [0.143] [0.138]
b. Bank Control
LNTA 3.813 *** 3.747 *** 3.813 *** 23.980 *** 3.823 ***
[0.192] [0.191] [0.187] [1.096] [0.193]
c. Country Macroeconomic Controls
PCGDP 0.001 *** [0.000] 0.001 *** [0.000] 0.001 ***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PCGDPG -3.339 *** 0.251 -3.339 *** -3.497 *** -3.66 ***
[0.102] [0.158] [0.099] [0.104] [0.107]
INFL -2.002 *** -1.574 *** -2.002 *** -2.301 *** -1.700 ***
[0.214] [0.356] [0.208] [0.223] [0.222]
d. Accounting Standard Fixed Effects
PRINCIPLES-BASED -21.131 *** -32.944 *** -21.131 *** - -19.970 ***
[6.309] [6.528] [6.137] - [7.457]
e. Prudential Regulation Fixed Effects
DYNAMIC 32.197 *** 10.979 32.197 *** - 23.616 **
[8.583] [8.629] [8.349] - [10.033]
Table 8.
LLP and Joint Change in Prudential Regulation and Accounting
Standards Regression
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Prior literature regarding the banking industry finds that managers often use 
their own discretion in the form of earnings management when estimating LLP. 
Explanations for such behavior have found broad empirical support in the income 
smoothing, capital management, and earnings signaling hypotheses. We revisit 
these three hypotheses for a large international sample of banking data that 
includes 7,343 commercial banks in 118 countries. We analyze the differences as to 
why bank managers would use LLP as an earnings management tool in regards to 
changes in accounting standards and changes in prudential regulation. Results are 
robust to econometric estimation and modeling specification, as we control bank 
asset size, country macroeconomic factors, and regulatory factors throughout the 
analysis.
Our findings support the notion that, in general, bank managers engage in 
earnings management of LLP for two motives: income smoothing and managing 
capital adequacy. We find no evidence supporting the earnings signaling argument. 
Evidence supporting a differential motivation for earnings management based on 
a change in regulatory regimes or accounting standards for the panel is weak. 
Table 8.
LLP and Joint Change in Prudential Regulation and Accounting
Standards Regression (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS YFE BFE RE GMM
f. Impact of Changes in both Standards
DynDumi,t*PrincDumi,t*LLPi,(t-1) 0.285 0.278 0.285 * -0.272 0.295 *
[0.174] [0.172] [0.169] [0.222] [0.175]
DynDumi,t*PrincDumi,t*CRARi,(t-1) 0.194 0.154 0.194 0.464 0.153
[0.384] [0.381] [0.373] [1.004] [0.389]
DynDumi,t*PrincDumi,t*EBTPi,t 0.245 0.047 0.245 1.024 0.165
[2.142] [2.123] [2.084] [2.893] [2.157]
DynDumi,t*PrincDumi,t*ΔEBTPi,(t-1) 0.532 0.398 0.532 -0.152 0.490
[0.857] [0.850] [0.834] [1.044] [0.857]
g. Country Regulatory/Legal Controls
PRIVO -36.339 *** -5.984 -36.339 *** -- -34.528 ***
[4.722] [5.478] [4.593] -- [5.241]
MCAP 29.471 *** 22.848 *** 29.471 *** -- 30.864 ***
[7.767] [7.809] [7.555] -- [8.859]
SPREAD -0.169 *** -0.073 -0.169 *** -- -0.228 ***
[0.045] [0.047] [0.043] -- [0.046]
PR -1.369 3.294 -1.369 -- -1.385
[2.487] [3.213] [2.420] -- [2.781]
DISCL 37.163 *** -18.027 37.163 *** -- 29.306 **
[11.874] [14.181] [11.551] -- [13.146]
EDF -1.658 *** -0.603 -1.658 *** -- -1.773 ***
[0.076] [0.102] [0.074] -- [0.084]
Adj. R-sqd. 0.403 0.414 0.403 0.435 0.404
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However, we do find that when a country transitions from pro-cyclical rules 
to dynamic provisioning rules, bank managers pursuing an income smoothing 
motive will generally maintain a larger amount for LLP. In contrast, bank managers 
pursuing capital management motives will set aside a slightly smaller amount of 
LLP.
Moreover, we note that if a country undergoes a (simultaneous) change 
in prudential regulation and accounting standards, the combined impact on 
the motivation for LLP earnings management is statistically insignificant. We 
document that banks under a principles-based accounting standard generally 
exhibit weaker earnings management when compared to their rules-based 
counterparts. Comparably, banks under the dynamic prudential regime are, in 
general, more likely to maintain additional levels of LLP compared to their pro-
cyclical opposites.
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